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approach to history in the capabilities literature has been questioned by scholars who have called for a greater attention to history in the strategy literature.
Concerns with Path Dependency
Researchers have argued that an over emphasis on path dependency has been the result of a 'narrow perspective' of history in the strategic management literature (Booth 2003: 99; Clark and Rowlinson, 2004) . Although path dependency has made a valuable contribution in terms of fortifying the theoretical underpinnings of the capability approach, it has also led to concerns among researchers resulting from its treatment of history. Booth (2003) and Clark and Rowlinson (2004) have identified three major areas of concern relating especially to the capabilities literature.
First, a major implication of path dependency in terms of capability development is 'lock in' effect. As current capabilities are considered a result of past investments and future capability developments are a result of current investments, the focus has been on examining factors that lead to the 'lock in' (a form of determinism), such as technological interrelatedness, dominant logic and so on, which determine the development of the existing capabilities. Path dependency often underplays the significance of alternatives available in history, present, and in future. On the other hand, a distinct theoretical contribution of resource/capabilities approach has been to recognise and underline the importance of management's ability to leverage their existing resource/capabilities into multiple strategic possibilities (Penrose 1959; Hamel and Prahalad 1994) . This is also reflected in practice, where managers often consider more than one option before committing to any particular strategy. Therefore, by giving greater attention to path dependency related issues, empirical studies have often underplayed the importance attributed to strategic options within the theoretical framework. Second, path dependency gives particular emphasis to specific decisions, turning points and events in history that led to the development of current capabilities. Consequently, the 'flux, continual crisis, and dilemma' within history are often underplayed in the empirical studies Third, in economics, where it was originally applied, the notion of path dependency recognises the inefficiencies in strategic choices as a result of lock-in effects of technological interrelatedness. In strategy, some researchers have made an attempt to theoretically examine this aspect, especially through notions such as 'core rigidities' ( ) and 'strategic liabilities ' (Arend 2004 ). Yet, within the empirical literature, researchers have to a large extent assumed that the capabilities that are developed as a result of technological interrelatedness are efficient strategy formulations.
To summarise, the notion of path dependency has been an integral part of the theoretical construct of the capabilities approach. Researchers have it mainly to assert the importance of history. In particular, it has helped to underline the uniqueness of a resource/capability, which is specific to a particular firm, thus helping it to maintain its distinctive advantage over competitors. As a result, empirical studies have devoted their efforts to establish the path dependency of a capability by examining the role of determining factors such as technological inter-relatedness in selection of the successful choice. However, an over emphasis on this aspect has led researchers, especially in empirical studies, to underplay an original tenet of the capabilities approach, i.e. the management's ability to craft multiple strategic options from existing resource/capabilities. This has resulted in an exclusive analysis of critical turning events and an unqualified assumption that the capability developed as a result of interrelatedness is an efficient strategy. The next section examines how these issues can be overcome through greater engagement with the history literature.
Historicist Approach to Countering Path dependency
One way to counter the problems of path dependency as discussed above is to give greater attention to the historical context and highlight the multiplicity of choices that were available before a particular course of action had been decided. Usually, firms consider more than one strategic capability development option before they chose a specific one.
Therefore, attention should be given to identifying the options that were under consideration and underline why certain options were not pursued. Historians (e.g. Elton 1967 and Carr 1964) have pointed out the importance of this aspect.
For Elton (1967) , history is an examination of events in the past that have left deposits in the present. It deals with the happenings, changes and particulars of the events that occurred in the past (p. 24). Hence, the study of history amounts to a 'search for truth' concerning these incidents (p. 70). In this endeavor, a 'professional' historian's aim is to get closer to the past and understand the characters 'until one knows what they are going to say next' (p. 30). While recreating this past, the determinist tendencies, which arise from a researcher's aim to justify a researcher's preconceived theories, must be avoided (p. 64-65). Elton argued that although some form of 'pattern making' may be necessary to put forward an explanation, the aim should be to highlight the 'multifarious and particular' nature of events (p. 128).
On the other hand, for Carr (1964) , the essence of history is in the interpretation of the past as opposed to the pursuit of truth. Carr questioned the over dependence on documents as a source through which to give accurate accounts of historical events. He argued that the content recorded in documents often depended on what the recorder thought had happened, or what he wanted others to think had happened (p. 13). As a result, the interpretation that the historian derives from the records carries greater weight. In order to arrive at a plausible interpretation, the historian is required to gain 'contact with the mind of those about whom he is writing' (p. 19). Carr also suggested that history is about the general as opposed to the particular (p. 62) arguing that history is concerned with 'relation' between the unique and the general, rather then the precedence of one over the other (p. 65). He acknowledged that in the quest for generalisation, the historian might be faced with the charge of being deterministic (p. 85). However, he questioned the notion that there were limitless possibilities at one's disposal (p. 87). Every human action is both free and determined to a certain extent (p. 89). Carr quelled the charge of determinism by suggesting that researchers sometimes use rhetorical language to label an event as an inevitable when they want to underline the point that a set of factors would make the likelihood of its occurrence as 'overwhelmingly strong ' (p. 90 ). Yet, he acknowledged that in practice, historians are aware of fluxes created by the alternative course of actions that were being considered by the actors: "In practice, historians do not assume that events are inevitable before they have taken place. They frequently discuss alternative courses available to the actors in the story on the assumption that the option was open, though they go on quite correctly to explain why one course was eventually chosen over the other" (p. 90).
Notably, Carr did not consider it a high priority to further explore the range of options that were under consideration. He left this job to 'poets and metaphysicians ' (p. 90) . Nevertheless, it is clear that historians from both 'traditional' and 'post-modern' schools have recognized the presence of multiple options prior to the selection of a course of action. Indeed, the examination of multiple options has received greater attention by historians practicing counterfactual analysis. In underlining the need to examine the various alternatives that were available, Trevor-Roper (1981) But not all historians have been receptive to the idea of counterfactual analysis. For instance, Carr (1964) termed the method as being akin to a 'parlor game' (p. 91). A major objection has been that counterfactual analysis relies on 'facts, which concededly never existed' (Ferguson 1997: 86) . In order to counter this, Ferguson suggested that researchers should consider plausible options as 'those alternatives, which can be shown on the basis of contemporary evidence that contemporaries actually considered' (p. 86).
Arguably, the use of history to establish path dependency only as an element within its theoretical construct would leave it short of fulfilling the potential that researchers have expected from its use. For example, when Helfat (2000) cautioned strategy researchers by citing the American philosopher George Santayana who remarked 'those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it', and Teece et al (1997) argued that 'history matters', there was an implicit call for greater attention to the prevailing historical context and the available alternatives. Theoretically, in order to avoid repeating history (assuming that events and lessons indicate issues that are not worth repeating), the first step would be a closer examination of various alternatives that were available during the historical context, so as to be able to make a judgment on exactly what to avoid.
This study examines the strategic options as a means of addressing the three major problems associated with path dependency identified in the earlier section. It does not aim to conduct a detailed counterfactual analysis of strategy options. Its focus is on the identification of the various strategic capability development options available to firms within a specified and localized industry and to examine why they were not pursued. Of course, it is possible that a capability developed by a firm may reflect path dependency.
However, initial identification of the option set allows an examination of why a particular capability was developed over the others and highlights the problems or barriers faced in pursuing the rejected options. In addition, by taking this approach, a greater understanding of the historical context is created and a better assessment of the influence of path dependency is possible.
Using this framework, the following sections describe the development of technological capabilities in the DJI between the late nineteenth century and 1970, in order to counter the growing international competition. In particular, it identifies the strategic options available to firms and the capabilities that were actually developed by four firms 1 -Buist Spinning, Jute Industries (JI), Scott & Fyfe (S&F) and Craiks -between period 2 and period 3. It also identifies factors, which led to selection of one capability development option over the other.
The Dundee Jute Industry
Like cotton, jute is a natural fibre. It is grown primarily in the Indian sub-continent, especially in the eastern Indian state of Bengal and Bangladesh. To this day, this region supplies the majority of the world's demand for raw jute. Its cultivation is confined to this region owing to the climatic conditions that are particularly suitable for growing this crop.
Although jute was spun and woven by handlooms in India for over two thousand years, it was in Dundee, Scotland, where modern production techniques were first introduced that enabled the industry to achieve its worldwide reputation.
Historically, textile firms in Dundee had used Russian flax as their primary fibre.
Jute was introduced in Dundee in the 1820s and 1830s. Initially, the flax manufacturers were not keen to use jute because it was considered an inferior option to flax (Woodhouse and Brand 1934) . However, the sudden cessation in the supply of flax from Russia during the Crimean War (1854-1856) left little room for this resistance. Jute provided a cheaper option to flax and the customers also accepted it. Thus, using modern production techniques, the DJI was born. With little international competition, it soon emerged as the 1 The primary criteria that governed the selection of cases was the availability of relevant archival data. The case studies represent the cross-section of the industry during this period, in terms of size (small and large), and focus (specialised and generalised). Buist: Small and specialising in spinning. Craiks: Small and specialising in weaving. S&F: Small and specialising in weaving. Jute Industries: Large and generalised.
part of the nineteenth century due to both its global monopoly on supply and to a large demand for sand bags during the American Civil War (1861-65) (Carrie 1953) . The quantity of imported raw jute gives an indication of the rapid growth of the industry during this period (see Figure 1) . Correspondingly, the number of spindles, looms and people employed in the industry expanded significantly (see Table 1 ). 
The Rise of Indian Competition and Contraction of the Dundee Jute Industry
Like the UK cotton industry, the jute industry witnessed a dramatic decline from the end of the nineteenth century. By 1944, raw jute imports into the UK had collapsed to less than 25% of their 1896 levels (See Figure 2 ) and the sector's size ranking had fallen to third in the world. 1901 1903 1905 1907 1909 1911 1913 1915 1917 1919 1921 1923 1925 1927 1929 1931 1933 1935 1937 1939 1941 1943 1945 The major challenge facing the jute industry up to late nineteenth century was the closing of traditional markets in Europe due to imposition of import tariffs and, more importantly, the rise of competition from the Indian industry. As with the case of continental European countries, tariffs were also imposed by India on the import of jute goods. By 1869, this duty was 7 ½ %. 2 There was a feeling within the Dundee industry that this was less to do with collection of revenue for the state government and more to do with protecting the growing industry in India. By the mid-1870s, the industry in Dundee found itself squeezed between two sides.
First, the growth in the Indian industry challenged the DJI in major international markets such as United Sates, South America, Asia, and Australia and second, high continental
European tariffs made it difficult to access major local markets and also gave rise to the growth of industries within these countries. The consequent capacity increase led directly to an excess of global supply with concomitant effects on price. The DJI had to develop a strategic response or face collapse. Its extant capabilities formed the basis for its reaction.
The next section describes key capabilities in jute manufacturing.
Capabilities in Jute Manufacturing
Like any textile industry using natural fibre, there are three major phases in jute manufacturing: preparation (assorting of raw jute), spinning (making yarn) and weaving (making cloth). Similarly, like any textile industry, jute manufacturing had two major products, yarn and cloth.
In weaving, capabilities can be categorised as the ability to make different widths, lengths, and weights of cloth. Tables 2 and 3 illustrate the different combination of widths and weights required to manufacture a certain type of yarn and cloth. For example, narrower width and relatively heavier cloth was suitable for the traditional sacking and bagging. On the other hand, lighter weight and narrow-width cloth was suitable for scrim cloth, which can be used, in the building industry. However, a wider-width and lightweight cloth is required for linoleum, wall coverings and carpet backing. In yarn, the weight was the major determinant. While the heavier counts went into making sacks and bags, the lighter ones were required for woven carpet yarns. Therefore, the variation in the width and weights in cloth and yarns also helped a firm's entry into new markets. However, manufacturing cloth of wider widths and yarn of finer qualities required a slightly different process and skills than that required for traditional narrow width cloth and heavy yarns. The traditional looms suitable for making sack and bag cloth were of narrow widths. They could be customized to produce wider width and long length cloth using internal engineering knowledge on existing machines. Traditionally, the machineries for jute manufacturing, including the drawing machine, spinning frames, looms and ancillary parts, were provided by specialised engineering firms. Internal engineering knowledge enables textile firms to make alterations on their own in order to make yarn and cloth of particular weight and width. These engineering skills acted also as an important supporting capability in developing capability in the wide-widths, long lengths and the introduction of new fibre, especially polypropylene. Hence, although a purpose built machine can be bought at market prices from a specialised engineering firm, if a textile firm possesses internal engineering skills, it can carry out modifications to existing machines to enable new fibre adoption faster than rivals and so develop new product, or adapt existing product, at much lower cost. In spinning, the capability takes the form of 'counts', which are broadly categorised into fine, medium and heavy. The Figure 3 illustrates capabilities in the spinning and weaving section of the jute industry.
The following two sections describe how firms within the industry used these capabilities to reposition themselves against the growing international competition between late nineteenth century and 1970.
Dundee's Strategic Repositioning and Capability Options during the late

Nineteenth Century
In order to meet the challenge of growing international competition, the DJI tried to reposition itself strategically in the late nineteenth century. The industry's efforts were guided by the idea of competing in areas where the Indian manufacturers would not able to challenge them. In order to do so, two major strategic capability development options were being considered within the industry.
First, there was a move to develop capabilities where the Indian industry could not compete. The basis of this argument was that workers in Dundee possessed superior skills in the spinning of yarn and the manufacturing of cloth, with which it was perceived that the Indian workers were not capable of developing. By leveraging their skills, the Dundee manufacturers could develop specialised and higher-class goods, which would fetch them better margins. Particular attention was given to the development of products for the linoleum and carpet industries. In addition, it was also felt that closer contacts with the customers were needed in order to develop 'specialty' products. These fine and specialty products soon provided advantages to Dundee firms. For instance, although the trade was bad during 1892, the specialty products recorded a particularly good turnover over normal types.
The efforts to focus on developing specialised products culminated in the establishment of a Technical School in 1888. It was hoped that besides teaching essential engineering skills for operating spinning and weaving machines, the institute would help in developing valuable skills in textile designs. The suggestion for a technical institute appears to have first emerged in the mid-1880s. When a question was asked by the Royal Commission about Dundee's efforts to deal with growing international competition, the Dundee Chamber of Commerce could offer no suggestions except point towards the fact that a 'great deal of money was invested in machinery in Dundee, and that it was difficult to alter it'. A suggestion was made to diversify from jute by providing the example of how the ribbon industry in Coventry went into making bicycles after the tariff on French ribbons was repealed in 1860. However, not all firms were prepared to make a 'jump of that sort'.
A technical institute, on the other hand, would help the industry to cultivate specialised skills in jute that were necessary to develop capabilities to meet the growing competition.
Although there was a general consensus within the industry that it was important to develop capabilities in areas where the Indian industry could not compete, there was always a lingering threat that the Indian manufacturers would soon catch-up with Dundee in whatever superior capabilities it developed. This was due to the relative technological simplicity in jute manufacturing.
Second, attempts were made to develop capabilities in new fibres. This was driven by the realization that any development within jute would soon be adopted by the Indian industry. By the 1890s, the DJI had become proactive in their search for alternate fibres. In his address to the industry, the local MP, Sir John Leng, acknowledged that if manufacturers 'develop the utmost finer class of goods, and aim at supplying the specialties which the markets of the world continually require', they could meet the challenge of international competition. He also urged them to be on a constant search for 'new varieties and new combination of materials, patterns, and finish.' Suggesting the possibility of exploring Rhea, a fibre that he had come across on his visit to Asia, he had the following suggestion for the industry:
"….the manipulation of Rhea, which has great possibilities, and which, I
believe within a few years will occupy a great position in the world of commerce and manufactures. Where I went in the East I found it was engaging the attention of the most intelligent and far-seeing men, and I saw and heard so much that if I were the head of a great manufacturing firm I would at once set aside 50,000 to 100,000 yards to thoroughly test the capabilities both of the Eastern production and British manufacture of their most promising fibre." 
Strategic Repositioning and Capabilities between 1919-1939 and 1945-1970
The examination of selected case studies suggests that firms responded to the growing international competition during the two periods 1919-1939 (Period 2) and (Period 3) by repositioning themselves strategically through the development of two broad sets of capabilities, within jute and with new fibre.
During period 2, the competition from the Indian industry was limited to the 'standard' sack and bag market and narrow width cloth. The examination of Buist and JI during this period indicates that these firms had consciously decided to move away from the areas where Indian competition was getting intense. The case of JI indicated that, in weaving, firms built capabilities in wide-width, lighter weight and long rolls of cloth. These were used mainly as backing cloth for linoleum. On the other hand, the case of Buist suggested that, in spinning, this corresponded to capability in medium and fine qualities of yarn for carpet yarns and yarns for lighter weight jute cloth that were being developed by weaving firms. Therefore, during this period, the repositioning was limited to entering new markets by developing further capabilities in jute. But this strategy was limited to only a few firms, while others stuck to their capability in narrow-width cloth and continued to operate in the traditional markets.
However, during period 3, a two-pronged repositioning strategy and capability development strategy was followed in both jute and new fibre. Up to the 1950s, a large part of the industry that had continued to operate in the traditional sack and bag market during the period 2, began to specialise and enter new markets. For example, S&F, after operating in the traditional narrow-width sack and bag market during this time, began to build its capability in the 1950s in wide-widths and long lengths. On the other hand, firms that had already specialised during period 2, found new product applications. For example, JI was one of the few firms that had already built a substantial capability in wide-width cloth that was used as a backing cloth for linoleum (a floor covering) by the end of period 2. During the 1950s, JI leveraged its capability in wide-width to develop carpet backing cloth.
Besides specialisation in jute, firms also began to introduce new fibres during the period 3.
For example, Craiks introduced cotton immediately after the end of the Second World War and, by the 1950s, half of its production was in cotton and synthetics. JI also made such strategic forays, with the establishment of paper sack and bags manufacture. However, until the second-half of 1960s, the new fibres were not adopted widely within the industry though they grew dramatically thereafter. 
Barriers to Strategic Repositioning and Capability Development
A major aspect of this research is to identify factors that played a part in a particular capability option that was not adopted. The jute industry faced options in developing capability within jute and for new fibres. The importance of these options was prominent during two key phases, period 1 and 3. An exploration of the factors that led the industry to develop its capability within jute, rather than new fibre, in period 1 and 2, and vice versa in period 3, will help to illustrate the contextual barriers that firms faced.
Period 1 and 2(1880s-1945)
This is the first period when strategic capability options were created in order to counter growing international competition. Between the two alternatives, jute and new fibre, firms concentrated their efforts on developing capabilities in the former until 1945.
Trials conducted with new fibres, especially with Ramie, between 1880s and 1890s highlight two major factors that acted as barriers in building capability in this area. The first was the unsuitability of new fibres to existing jute machineries and required new machinery and processing techniques. However, with some modifications to the machines, the fibre could be manufactured to a satisfactory quality.
Second, it transpired that the cost of manufacturing this fibre was higher than that of jute. Between the two, the second issue had a greater implication then the first one. It is important to appreciate the industry's concern for price sensitivity when introducing new fibres. The cheapness of jute was one of the major factors in its substitution of flax.
Therefore, the matter of cost would be a major issue if a new fibre was to replace jute. Furthermore, jute had been able to maintain its dominance in the world markets due to its cheapness.
During the period 2, the industry was unable to find a cheaper fibre than jute. For example, when a sample was sent to JI in 1928, its Director termed the fibre as being 'too good' for them. As a result, firms continued to build their capability in jute as part of the strategic response. But the potential of capabilities in jute to counter international competition declined dramatically during the period 3 leading to the importance of developing capabilities in new fibre, as discussed in the following section.
Period 3 (1945-1970)
coarseness of the fibre-unlike cotton-so you were faced with, relatively speaking, bulky yarns because you could not get it down to anything really fine. And even had you succeeded in doing that, the applications were fairly limited. There is a certain restriction on development because of the nature of the fibre itself." Industry' found that only a handful firms had begun using new alternates. As Table 4 below indicates, of the total 57 firms surveyed, 38 firms were wholly dependent on jute. Of the remaining, only 9 firms were using synthetic fibres to some extent (largely rayon, with 2 firms also using nylon), 2 firms were using wool, 1 firm was making paper and felt, 1 firm had diversified partly into engineering, 3 firms were engaged in carpet and brattice cloth, and 1 firm in flax. Only 1 firm had completely changed over from jute to rayon. Polypropylene had three major technical advantages over jute in traditional products.
First, jute was prone to rotting if used in damp conditions. Second, jute being a biodegradable fibre, tended to lose its colour and texture if it was exposed to sunlight for an extended period of time. Being a synthetic fibre, Polypropylene was able to overcome these two limitations of jute. Third, in the process of making tufted carpets-a primary market for jute, the jute primary backing cloth was highly prone to breaking needles that were inserted in it. When needles were punched though it, they tend to get brushed aside.
On the other hand, Polypropylene fabric was an 'acceptor' of needles. As the needle was punched down, the fabric would spread around it. As a result, the pile was placed much closer to where it was intended to be. On the other hand, the fibrous nature of jute provided However, in order to overcome this, latexing was introduced to achieve better bonding between the Polypropylene backing and the carpet pile. Other aspects such as less waste in production and relative stability in raw material's supply and prices also combined to make
Polypropylene an attractive option to jute.
Besides being technically superior, Polypropylene was also cheaper than jute, at-least Why did it take the industry until the 1960s to introduce it? An initial analysis points to both physical and cognitive 'lock in' effects. The physical properties of the fibre and its relative cost advantage restricted its use to industrial markets in the main. The characteristics of jute limited further developments within jute, which meant that it was difficult to apply it to other more lucrative global markets e.g., consumer goods. In addition, the relative cheapness of jute meant that it was tough to find another fibre to match the commercial and technological qualities of jute to replace it in the traditional markets. The second explanation is cognitive. MacKay, Masrani and McKiernan (2006) have argued that a 'jute' mentality dominated thinking within the sector. Its intensity and symbolism were reflected and reinforced in local committees, institutes, supply chains, press and research papers. For instance, since the introduction of jute in 1850s, the industry was widely known by its supply side raw material, as the 'Dundee Jute Industry', rather than by demand side customers it served in the industrial markets e.g., the packaging industry. As a result, the innovations, both products and process, were mainly within jute (p. 935-936) . Had the industry perceived itself as a 'packaging' industry, it could have avoided locking itself into jute only innovations and could have been more vigorous in its search for new fibres (p. 936). These two explanations are not necessarily mutually exclusive. In fact, it is also possible that the cheapness of jute and the inability to find any other fibre to replace it could have led to the belief within the industry that 'jute is king' and is irreplaceable.
Conclusion
This study has made an attempt to address the three major problems associated with path dependency in the capabilities literature: a) it examined the strategic options and reasons why some options were selected over others. b) it gave emphasis to the on-going flux and crisis in selecting the capability alternatives and; c) it queried the predominant belief that the capabilities actually developed formed the most efficient strategy.
Clearly, the pattern of capability development in the DJI during period 2 and 3 that was generated to counter growing international competition can be explained by the traditional path dependency related aspects such as technological interrelatedness. For example, firms developed capabilities in jute wide-width cloth and jute finer yarns by making use of their existing capabilities in jute. But assuming that, because of technological relatedness, the further development of capabilities within jute was the only option considered by the firms within the industry would be incorrect. As this study has found, the firms also considered the possibility of developing capability in a new fibre (the Road Less Traveled) as early as the 1880s and again after the end of the Second World War. Nonetheless, the inability to find a fibre with technological and commercial viability to replace jute in its traditional markets played a major role in selecting the jute capability development option over the new fibre option. But when firms were able to develop capability in a new fibre, as with Polypropylene, the significance of developing capability in jute declined dramatically. This study made an attempt not to limit the examination to a single event or turning point as a dominant factor in influencing capability development.
As a result, the findings of the study have been able to illuminate the constant flux and dilemmas pertaining to the selection of strategic capability options. Yet, it is evident from the case study that, in the long term, the further development of capabilities within jute was not the most efficient option in order to counter growing international competition.
Though, it offered some support in the medium term, this became tough to sustain and the DJI collapsed finally during the 1980s.
This chapter has argued that the attribution of the development of a particular capability only to path dependency and its determinant factors such as technological interrelatedness does not lead to a full understanding of the historical context within which the capabilities are developed. Such myopia robs the analysis of knowledge of the range of options available to a firm and an opportunity to gain deeper understanding as to why a particular capability was pursued over others. This can be addressed by following a two pronged strategy: first, through the identification of strategic capability development options that were being considered by the firm before committing to a particular capability and second, through the juxtaposition of alternatives and the examination of the reasons why certain alternatives were discarded. In particular, an investigation of the role of factors other than those traditionally related to path dependency would shed fresh light on the issue. In this context, the role of agency in influencing the rejection, or selection, of particular capability development option offers a possible avenue for future research. The capabilities literature should make, and note, the greater concentrated attempt to engage with history. This chapter made a concerted attempt to engage with history within the strategy literature illustrating that there is a great scope for the use of historicist methodology to gain a better understanding of firm strategies.
The findings of this study have several implications for research on foresight. First, sectors exhibit a patterning throughout history whose signatures are repeated in the present.
These case studies illustrate that 'not much is new' in strategic terms in modern industries that was not replicated at some stage in past sectors. For example, the events and crises in the DJI and have a parallel in history of the UK Cotton Industry (for example, see Rose 1990; Singleton 1991) and can be witnessed in any study of UK car production from 1945 to 1985. Hence, a methodical study of firm and industry histories can help to put the present and future into context. Second, firms can confuse a path dependent option with a best way
